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Abstract
We present a new concern when collecting data from individuals that arises from the attempt
to mitigate privacy leakage in multiple reporting: tracking of users participating in the data
collection via the mechanisms added to provide privacy. We present several definitions for
untrackable mechanisms, inspired by the differential privacy framework.
Specifically, we define the trackable parameter as the log of the maximum ratio between
the probability that a set of reports originated from a single user and the probability that
the same set of reports originated from two users (with the same private value). We explore
the implications of this new definition. We show how differentially private and untrackable
mechanisms can be combined to achieve a bound for the problem of detecting when a certain
user changed their private value.
Examining Google’s deployed solution for everlasting privacy, we show that RAPPOR (Er-
lingsson et al. ACM CCS, 2014) is trackable in our framework for the parameters presented in
their paper.
We analyze a variant of randomized response for collecting statistics of single bits, Bitwise
Everlasting Privacy, that achieves good accuracy and everlasting privacy, while only being rea-
sonably untrackable, specifically grows linearly in the number of reports. For collecting statistics
about data from larger domains (for histograms and heavy hitters) we present a mechanism that
prevents tracking for a limited number of responses.
We also present the concept of Mechanism Chaining, using the output of one mechanism
as the input of another, in the scope of Differential Privacy, and show that the chaining of an
ε1-LDP mechanism with an ε2-LDP mechanism is ln
e
ε1+ε2+1
eε1+eε2
-LDP and that this bound is tight.
1 Introduction
The cure should not be worse than the disease. In this paper we raise the issue that mechanisms
for Differentially Private data collection enable the tracking of users. This wouldn’t be the first
time an innocent solution for an important problem is exploited for the purposes of tracking. Web
cookies, designed to let users maintain a session between different web pages, is now the basis of
many user tracking implementations. In the Differential Privacy world, we examine how various
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solutions meant to protect the privacy of users over long periods of time actually enable the tracking
of participants.
To better understand this, consider the following scenario: A browser developer might wish to
learn what which are the most common homepages, for caching purposes, or perhaps to identify
suspiciously popular homepages that might be an evidence for the spreading of a new virus. They
develop a mechanism for collecting the URLs of users’ homepages. Being very privacy aware, they
also make sure that the data sent back to them is Differentially Private. They want to ensure they
can collect this data twice a day without allowing someone with access to the reports to figure out
the homepage of any individual user.
If fresh randomness is used to generate each differentially private report, then the danger is
that information about the users homepage would be revealed eventually to someone who follows
the user’s reports. We strive to what we call “Everlasting Privacy”, the property of maintaining
privacy no matter how many collections were made. In our example, the users achieve everlasting
privacy by correlating the answers given at each collection time: e.g. a simple way is that each user
fixes the randomness they use, and so sends the same report at each collection.
Now consider Alice, a user who reports from her work place during the day and from her
home during the evening. At every collection, Alice always reports regarding the same homepage1,
and therefore (since the randomness was fixed) sends identical reports at home and at work. An
eavesdropper examining a report from the work IP address and a report from Alice’s home IP
address would notice that they are the same, while if they examined a report generated by Alice
and one generated by Bob (with the same homepage) they will very likely be different. This allows
the adversary to find out where Alice lives.
To elaborate, correlation based solutions open the door to the new kind of issue, tracking
users. The correlation between reports can be used as an instrument of identifying individuals, in
particular it makes the decision problem of whether or not two sets of reports originated from the
same user much easier. This concern has been suggested by the RAPPOR project [14] but without
a formal definition, or analysis in the framework where their solution was provided.
The problem of tracking users is related to the problem of point change detection, i.e. identifying
when a stream of samples switched from one distribution to another. While this problem has been
researched in the past under the lens of privacy by Cummings et al. [6, 5], these works focused on
private release of point change detection, i.e. how to enable researchers to detect changes in the
sampled distribution while not being too reliant on any specific sample. Our goal is different. We
wish to prevent change point detection as much as we can; as in our case, a change in distribution
correlates to a change in private value. Detecting a change in private value jeopardizes the privacy
of the user (think of a case where the gender is changed).
1.1 Our Contributions
The main conceptual contribution of this work is the definition of reports being untrackable, pre-
sented in Section 3. Roughly, the definition states that the distribution on outputs generated by
a single user needs to be sufficiently close to that generated by two users. For the discussion on
motivation and possible variants see Section 3.4
1The reader may be wondering why bother reporting about the same value if it does not change. For instance it
may for purposes of aggregating information about the currently online population.
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Definition 1.1 (informal). A mechanism M is (γ, δ)-Untrackable for k reports, if for any k reports
Pr [Reports were generated by one user] ≤ eγPr [Reports were generated by two users] + δ
We present a formal definition to Everlasting Privacy. Roughly speaking, a mechanism is (γ, δ)-
Everlasting Privacy if executing it any number of times is (γ, δ)-DP. Our main goal is to simulta-
neously achieve both tracking prevention and everlasting privacy, while maintaining a reasonable
accuracy for the global statistics. We explore the implications of this new definition, specifically
how it composes and what a fixed state that is reported in a noisy manner can achieve.
We describe how our tracking definitions can be extended to the change point detection frame-
work, namely to bound the probability that a change in the user’s private value is ever detected. In
that section we also discuss the necessity of correlating answers between data collections to ensure
Differential Privacy, and define various general constructions for mechanisms that can achieve this
Everlasting Differential Privacy.
As a tool for analyzing such constructions, in Section 4 we prove a theorem about running a
Local Differential Privacy mechanism on the output of another such mechanism.
Theorem 1.2 (informal). A mechanism that consists of running an ε2-LDP mechanism on the
result of an ε1-LDP mechanism results in
1
2ε1 · ε2-LDP for small ε1 and ε2.
Theorem 4.3 and Corollary 4.4 provide the formal statement and proof.
We then continue to analyze Google RAPPOR’s [14] performance under the framework of
tracking. We show the pure tracking bound RAPPOR achieves as well as estimate its “average”
case performance. We cocnslude that according to our definition of untrackable, RAPPOR achieves
poor protection guarantees. This is presented in Section 5.
As a warm up, in Section 6 we present a mechanism that deals with data collection of a single
private bit from each participant. One can view it as the extension of randomized response in
this setting. Each user generates a bit at random and remembers it. At each collection, the user
generates an new bit and sends the XOR of the private bit, the remembered bit and the new bit.
The remembered bit is generated by flipping one biased coin, parameterized by ε1. The new bits
are generated from fresh coin flips from another biased coin, parameterized by ε2. The aggregator
collects all the reports and outputs estimated frequencies for both 0 and 1. We prove that for
a choice of privacy parameters ε1, ε2 < 1, and for n participating users, the mechanism has the
properties:
(i) It is ε1-Everlasting Differentially Private.
(ii) Accuracy: the frequency estimation of 0 and 1 is no further than O˜
(
1
ε1·ε2·
√
n
)
from the actual
values.
(iii) It is ⌊k2⌋ε2-untrackable for k reports.
In Section 7 we present a mechanism that allows the collection of statistics of users private
values when their data is d bits. This mechanism is particularly relevant for the problems of heavy
hitters estimations and histograms. The mechanism’s state consists of the results of the inner
product of the private value with multiple vectors in a way that is Differentially Private, reporting
one such vector and the private result of the inner product at each data collection. The aggregator
collects all the reports and produces an estimate for the frequencies of all possible values, such that
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the sum of frequencies is 1. We prove that for a choice of privacy parameters ε < 1, setting the
state to consist of L reports, and for n participating users, the mechanism has the properties:
(i) It is (ε, δ)-Approximate Everlasting Differentially Private.
(ii) The estimation of the frequency of all values is no further than O˜
(
1
ε′
√
d
n
)
from the actual
frequency, for ε′ = ε
2
√
2L ln( 1δ )
.
(iii) It is
(
0, k
2
L
)
-untrackable.
Concretely, to obtain (ε, δ)-Everlasting Privacy and α accuracy, then for k reports the guarantee
on the mechanism is
(
0, O˜
(
k2
α2ε2n
))
-Untrackable.
Coming up with better bounds or showing the inherent limitations is the main open direction
we propose (see Section 8).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy
For background on Differential Privacy see Dwork and Roth [11] or Vadhan [19].
Throughout most of this paper we consider a variant of Differential Privacy, called Local Differ-
ential Privacy. Local Differential Privacy regards mechanisms where each individual user runs on
their own data to create a report, which is then sent to the server and aggregated there to produce
a population level result. The setting we consider is one where the aggregator access the users’
data only through a randomized mapping, a mechanism, that has the following property:
Definition 2.1 ([16]). Let ε, δ > 0. A mechanism M : U 7→ O is (ε, δ)-Local Differentially Private
if for every two possible inputs, u, u′ ∈ U , and ∀S ⊆ O, Pr [M (u) ∈ S] ≤ eε · Pr [M (u′) ∈ S] + δ
One of the significant properties of Differential Privacy is the way it composes. Composing
two mechanisms that are (ε1, δ1) and (ε2, δ2)-Differentially Private respectively is (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-
Differentially Private. A small deterioration in the δ parameter achieves a great improvement in
the ε parameter of the composition.
Theorem 2.2 (Advanced composition for Differential Privacy [12]). Let δ′ > 0. The k fold
composition of (ε, δ)-Differentially Private mechanisms is (ε′, kδ + δ′)-Differentially Private for
ε′ =
√
2k ln (1/δ′)ε+ kε (eε − 1)
Another useful property of Differential Privacy is that running any function on the output of an
(ε, δ)-Differentially Private mechanism is (ε, δ)-Differentially Private. That is, Differential Privacy
is closed under post-processing.
When using the same mechanism to collect reports multiple times, if not done carefully, the pri-
vacy guarantee might deteriorate as the number of collections periods grows. We define Everlasting
Differential Privacy as an upper bound on the privacy parameter of a mechanism, no matter how
many times it is executed, as long as the private data had not changed. Definition 3.6 formalizes
this idea.
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2.2 Background
The need for everlasting privacy became apparent since the early stages of the Differential Privacy
research. As mentioned in Section 2, independent repetitive executions of Differential Privacy
mechanisms inevitably deteriorate the privacy guarantee. While Theorem 2.2 teaches us that the
privacy guarantee can grow as low as only the square root of the number of reports, practical
implementations might require users to participate in as many as thousands of data collections
(e.g. anything requiring daily reports).
This led researchers to suggest data collection mechanisms that allow numerous data collections,
while maintaining individuals’ privacy. Certain solutions, such as Google’s RAPPOR [14] and
Microsoft’s dBitFLip [7], use the concept of statefulness, maintaining some data between executions.
This enables them to correlate outputs between executions, which allows for a manageable upper
bound of the privacy leakage that does not rely on the number of collections made. This effectively
allows for a privacy guarantee that holds forever, namely Everlasting Privacy.
Heavy Hitter Mechanisms: Two problems that have been very interesting for data collectors
are the histogram and heavy hitters problems. In the histogram problem the goal is to accurately
estimate the frequencies of all possible values the population might hold. The heavy hitters problem
is about identifying the most common values amongst the population. Both histograms and heavy
hitters in the local model has been researched before by Bassily et al. [3, 2], who used Hadamard
transformations on the users private data that allow users to send succinct reports to the curator
while allowing the required statistics to be generated very efficiently. These works do not fit our
framework, as they intrinsically allow for trackability. In their solution, each user is associated
with a specific piece of some shared randomness. The aggregator must know to which piece of
randomness a specific report belongs to, essentially forcing their solution to be highly trackable.
The techniques used in their paper are similar to the ones used by Naor et al. [18]. In that work the
authors use an inner product mechanism to identify and ban the most common passwords. This
enables the increase in the effective time an adversary will need to invest in order to guess a user’s
password. Their mechanism maintains Differential Privacy to prevent the leakage of each individ-
ual’s password, but it does not maintain Everlasting Privacy. They also mention a modification to
their scheme achieves Everlasting Privacy, by reusing the same random vector for all future inner
products, but such a solution is highly trackable. The inner product mechanisms used in [3, 2, 18]
were the inspiration of our Noisy Inner Product mechanism presented in 7.
Continual Observation and Pan Privacy: Other models and solutions to long-lasting privacy
have been developed as well, such as the Continual Observation model in [8, 4]. The goal is to
maintains differential privacy for values that change over time, e.g. a counter that updates over time,
or streams of data, like traffic conditions and so on. This solution is in the central, or streaming,
model and not in the local model. Another model is that of Pan Privacy, where the goal is to
maintain privacy even if the internal representation of the secret state is leaked from time to time
(Dwork et al. [9]). In Erlignsson et al. [13] this idea was extended, transforming the mechanism
in [8] to the local model, in order to solve the 1-bit histogram problem, and thus achieving privacy
over extended periods of time. The transformation means that every user reports genuinely only
once throughout all data collections, thus resulting in accuracy that relies linearly in the number
of times their value changed. This suggests that accuracy will drop as collection times increase.
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Joseph et al. [15] suggested an approach where at the beginning, a global update occurs, where
each individual participates in a private histogram estimation. At each subsequent potential col-
lection time, each user compares their current contribution to the histogram compared to the last
time a global update occurs. Depending on how different it is, they are more likely to suggest that
another global update occurs. If enough users vote in favor, the curator initiates another round
of global update, creating a more accurate histogram. This solution allows for collections to be
made from users only when it is likely that the previously computed output is no longer accurate,
greatly increasing the privacy guarantee of individuals. On the other hand, their accuracy analysis
relies on the existence of a small number of user types, where all users of the same type behave
identically.
3 Stateful Mechanisms and Tracking
Consider a mechanism for users to report their values to a center.Such mechanisms may be stateless,
i.e. ones that receive an input and (probabilistically) produce an output, or stateful mechanisms,
ones that receive in addition to the input a state and produce in addition to an output a state for
the next execution. The power of stateful mechanisms is that they enable the correlation of outputs
between different executions through the states passed from one execution to the next.
3.1 Definitions of Mechanisms and Report Stream Generators
Stateless mechanisms are randomized mappings for which each execution is independent of the
others. Stateless mechanisms receive the user’s data and publicly available information, namely
auxiliary information, and output a report. The publicly available information can be anything
known to all parties, like time of day, value of some publicly accessible counter, etc.
Definition 3.1 (Stateless Mechanism). A stateless mechanism M is a randomized mapping from
a user’s data and auxiliary information to the domain of reports, M : U × A × {0, 1}⋆ 7→ R. In
our setting it is used to generate a stream of reports, r1, r2, . . ., where each report is generated
independently.
Stateless mechanisms might provide very poor everlasting privacy, as each iteration reveals more
information about the user’s data.
Therefore, to achieve everlasting privacy one must correlate the reports sent by the user(s) (see
for instance [10] where this is proved for counting queries). For this we define Stateful Mechanisms,
where the mechanism maintains a state that is updated with each call to the mechanism.
Definition 3.2 (Fully Stateful Mechanism). A fully stateful mechanism M is a randomized map-
ping from a user’s data, current state and auxiliary information to the domain of reports and to
a new state, M : U × S × A × {0, 1}⋆ 7→ R × S. In our setting it is used to generate a stream of
reports r1, r2, . . . and a stream of states s0 = ⊥, s1, . . ., such that each pair of state and report are
generated by the previous state, auxiliary information and the user’s data, ri, si =M (u, si−1, ai−1)
Notice that the execution number and all previous outputs can be encoded into the state. A
fully stateful mechanism can achieve everlasting privacy by correlating answers using the data
stored in the state. For example, it can execute a DP mechanism on the user’s data and remember
the result, reporting the same result whenever queried.
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One shortcoming of correlating the reports in such a manner is that it might be used as an
identifier by an adversary, potentially allowing the adversary to identify that a group of reports all
originated from the same user, thus allowing tracking other activities of the user (see Section 3.2).
We define Permanent State Mechanisms as mechanisms that maintain the same state once set,
i.e. s1 = s2 = s3.... As we shall see, such mechanisms are very convenient to work with and have
good properties wrt composition.
Report stream generators (RSG) are mappings that use mechanisms to generate a stream of
reports. The responsibility of the RSG is to get the user’s data and iteratively call the mechanism.
Definition 3.3 (Stateless Report Stream Generator). For a domain of user data U , a range
of reports R, and a report stream size n, A Stateless Report Stream Generator using a stateless
mechanism M is a mapping GMn : U 7→ Rn, that acquires the auxiliary information required at each
step and calls M to generate the reports r1, . . . , rn.
Similarly, stateful RGSs use fully stateful mechanisms to generate the stream of reports.
Definition 3.4 (Stateful Report Stream Generator). For a domain of user data U , a range of
reports R, and a report stream size n, A Stateful Report Stream Generator using a fully stateful
mechanism M is a mapping GMn : U 7→ Rn, that acquires the auxiliary information required at each
step and calls M with the state of the current step to generate report ri and the next step’s state si.
3.2 Everlasting Privacy and Tracking
The problem we focus on is the ability of an adversary to distinguish whether or not a set of reports
originated from a single user or by two users (or more, see Section 3.4). For example, If an adversary
had two sets of reports belonging to two different IP addresses, the adversary could learn if those
IP addresses belong to the same user or not (potentially identifying the user’s work place or home
address). The definition of untrackable we propose is inspired by definition of Differential Privacy.
Definition 3.5. For a domain of user data U , a range of reports R and a report stream size k,
a report stream generator GMk is (γ, δ)-untrackable if for all user data u ∈ U , for all subsets of
indices J ⊆ [k], J∁ = [k] \ J and ∀T ⊆ Rk we have:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ eγ · Pr [GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ] · Pr [GMk−|J | (u) ∈ TJ∁]+ δ
and
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J | (u) ∈ TJ∁
]
≤ eγ · Pr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]+ δ
For report stream generators that are (γ, δ)-untrackable, an adversary has only a small ad-
vantage in distinguishing between the following two cases: the reports originated from a single
user or two users. A discussion for the idea behind this definition and its benefits can be found
in Section 3.4. If we want this property to hold for any possible output (i.e. always have the
ambiguity), then we can demand that the mechanism be (γ, 0)-untrackable. We call such mecha-
nisms γ-untrackable. We leverage the similarity to DP show composition theorems on untrackable
mechanisms.
Everlasting Privacy is meant to limit the leakage of information users suffer, no matter how
many executions a mechanism had. For the following definitions let T be a collection of report
streams. For a set of indices J let TJ be the collection of partial report stream, where the reports
taken are those in indices J .
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Definition 3.6 (Everlasting Privacy). For a domain of user data U , a range of reports R, a report
stream generator GMk is (ε, δ)-Everlasting Privacy if for all user data u, u
′ ∈ U , for all report
stream size k and for all sets of output streams T ⊆ Rk, Pr [GMk (u) ∈ T ] ≤ eεPr [GMk (u′) ∈ T ]+δ
If a mechanism is (ε, 0)-Everlasting Privacy we say it is ε-Everlasting Privacy.
These definitions are tightly related to the problem of change-point detection. We define unde-
tectability similarly to untrackability, only we do not assume both report sets originated from the
same private data:
Definition 3.7. For a domain of user data U , a range of reports R and a report stream size k, a
report stream generator GMk is (γ, δ)-undetectable if for all pairs of user data u, u
′ ∈ U , for all
subsets of indices J ⊆ [k], J∁ = [k] \ J and ∀T ⊆ Rk we have:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ eγ · Pr [GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ] · Pr [GMk−|J | (u′) ∈ TJ∁]+ δ
and
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J |
(
u′
) ∈ TJ∁] ≤ eγ · Pr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]+ δ.
We can now connect being untrackable and everlasting privacy with being undetectable.
Theorem 3.8. A mechanism that is (γ, δ)-untrackable and (ε, δ′)-everlasting differentially private
is also (γ + ε, δmax)-undetectable, for δmax = max {eεδ + δ′, δ + eγδ′}.
The proof for this theorem can be found in Appendix B.1
3.3 Tracking Bounds, Composition Theorems and Generalizations
For the special case of Permanent State Mechanisms, we can show an upper bound on the untrack-
able parameter. If the mechanism is ε-Differentially Private in its state, i.e. the mechanism protects
the privacy of the state, then the untrackable parameter grows linearly in ε:
Theorem 3.9. A Permanent state mechanism whose reports are generated by an ε-Differentially
Private mechanism receiving the state as its input is
⌊
k
2
⌋
ε-untrackable for k reports.
The proof for this theorem can be found in B.2
An important question is how tracking composes, i.e. how does a user’s participation in multiple
Report Stream Generators affect his untrackable guarantees. The similarity between the definition
of untrackability and differential privacy allows us to apply results regarding the latter to obtain
results on the former. We show an advanced composition for untrackable mechanisms that is
analogous to advanced composition for differential privacy [12] and Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 3.10 (Advanced composition for untrackability). Let m be a positive integer. Let
{Mi}i∈[m] be m mechanisms that are (γ, δ)-untrackable for ki reports respectively. The composition
of these mechanisms, M̂ , is (γ′,mδ + δ′)-untrackable for
γ′ =
√
2m ln (1/δ′) · γ +m · γ (eγ − 1)
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The proof for this theorem, as well as the formal definition of composition, can be found in B.3
Another important question is what can be said about the untrackable guarantees in the settings
where the reports are split into more than two sets, i.e. when we want to answer the question whether
some reports were generated by a single user or any number of users. For this we define untrackable
for n users for k reports.
Definition 3.11 (Multiple User Untrackable). For a domain of user data U , a range of reports R
and a report stream size k, and n users, a report stream generator GMk is γ-multiple user untrackable
if for all user data u ∈ U , all partitions P = {Pi}i∈[n] of [k] into n parts, and all output stream sets
T ⊆ Rk:
e−γ ≤
∏
j∈[n] Pr
[
GM|Pj | (u) ∈ TPj
]
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ eγ
We show two connections between Definitions 3.5 and 3.11: the first is a general bound, essen-
tially saying that the untrackable parameter increases linearly in the number of users.
Theorem 3.12. A mechanism that is γ-untrackable for k reports, is (n− 1) γ-multiple user un-
trackable for n users for k reports.
We can significantly improve this bound for permanent state mechanisms by leveraging the fact
that their untrackable parameter is linear in the number of reports used.
Theorem 3.13. A permanent state mechanism M , who generates reports using an ε-Differentially
Private mechanism receiving the state as its input, is ⌈log n⌉⌊k2⌋ε-multiple user untrackable for n
users for k reports.
The proofs of these theorems can be found in Section B.4 and B.5
3.4 Discussion
The way we defined untrackable is not the only one possible. The “typical” attack we wish to
prevent is against an adversary that sees many sets of reports and tries to identify two that belong
to the same user. However, making this the basis of a definition might result in weak guarantees,
as it disregards any prior information that an adversary might have. The adversary might know
that Alice only lives in one of two houses, and only tries to identify where she lives. Our definition
is designed to protect against exactly this kind of attacker, who only tries to distinguish whether a
stream of reports was generated by Alice, or partly by Alice and partly by Bob.
Another natural definition is to prevent distinguishing whether a stream of reports was generated
by any combination of users vs. any other combination of users. Our definition, though appearing
weaker than this one, actually implies it, with some deterioration to the parameter; Theorem
3.12 suggests that the parameter deteriorates linearly in the number of users, while Theorem 3.11
suggests that in some cases it can deteriorate logarithmically.
Our definition also implies that it would be hard to decide whether any two reports were both
generated by Alice, or one by Alice and one by Bob. This property might seem tempting as a basis
of an alternative untrackable definition, but it is too weak on its own. A mechanism that has this
property might have very poor protection against adversaries with access to more than two reports.
9
Finally, Theorem 3.8 teaches us that our definition, when combined with everlasting privacy,
naturally extends to the problem of change point (un)detection. That is, a mechanism that adheres
both to the everlasting privacy requirement and our untrackable definition also protects the fact
that a user changed their private value.
In conclusion, This definition is strong enough to protect users against reasonable adversaries,
i.e. ones who have some prior knowledge about the locations of users. On the other hand, while
seeming weaker than other definitions it actually implies them. Additionally, as can be seen in
Sections 6 and 7, it is achievable while also allowing for reasonable everlasting privacy guarantees
and accuracy.
4 Mechanism Chaining
In this section we generalize the idea presented in Theorem 3.9 of using a Differential Privacy
mechanism on the output of another such mechanism. We first provide a formal definition for
this mechanism chaining, and then state and prove two theorems about the Differential Privacy
guarantee achieved by doing such chaining. The first weak, but intuitive, the second much more
powerful and also optimal.
4.1 Definitions
We now present mechanism chaining in three different settings: In the first setting we simply define
the chaining of two mechanisms as taking the output of the first and using it as the input of the
second.
Definition 4.1 (2 Local Mechanism Chaining). Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O,
the chaining of these two mechanisms MB◦A : U → O is defined as MB◦A (u) = B (A (u))
The second setting we examine is the chaining of k mechanism, and the third and final setting
is the chaining of k families of mechanisms that are not necessarily local. They are not relevant for
the rest of this paper, but for completeness we present them in Appendix C.
4.2 Differential Privacy Guarantees for Two Mechanism Chaining
We now present a tight bound on the Differential Privacy guarantee of the chaining of two mech-
anisms. We begin by presenting the “Basic Chaining Upper Bound”, which is not tight, but is
perhaps more intuitive. We then present a better upper bound called the “Advanced Chaining
Upper Bound”. Basic Chaining simply says that the resulting Differential Privacy is no worse than
the Differential Privacy of either mechanisms.
Theorem 4.2 (Basic Chaining). Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O that are
ε1-LDP and ε2-LDP respectively, MB◦A : U → O is min {ε1, ε2}-LDP.
The advanced chaining bound is always better:
Theorem 4.3 (Advanced Chaining). Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O that are
ε1-LDP and ε2-LDP respectively, MB◦A : U → O is ln eε1+ε2+1eε1+eε2 -LDP.
The proof of these theorem can be found in D.1 and D.2. The privacy parameter can be upper
bounded by a more simple bound that is meaningful for small ε1 and ε2:
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Corollary 4.4. Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O that are ε1-LDP and ε2-LDP
respectively, MB◦A : U → O is 12ε1 · ε2-LDP.
When ε1 or ε2 are greater than 2 this upper bound is worse than the bound in Theorem 4.2, let
alone the optimal one in Theorem 4.3, but otherwise this bound has little error compared to the
optimal bound and is easier to work with.
5 (Un)Trackability in RAPPOR
Equipped with a new framework to analyze tracking, we first consider one of the most significant
deployments of a differentially private mechanism, used in all Chrome copies, and analyze its
trackability. Introduced in [14], RAPPOR is a DP mechanism designed to allow repeated collection
of telemetry data from users in Chrome. This mechanism was the starting point of this work, since
some of the goals stated in the original paper indicate the desirability of being untrackable.
Roughly speaking, RAPPOR reports a value (e.g. the homepage of a user) from a large set. It
does so with the help of a Bloom filter that initially encodes a set that contains a single element, the
desired value. A Bloom filter’s output is an all 0 array that is set to 1 at locations corresponding to
hashes of the value. The mechanism proceeds to randomly flip bits in the Bloom filter, generating
what we call the Permanent Randomization. At each point in time when data is to be collected,
the mechanism generates a report by taking a copy of the Permanent Randomization and, again,
randomly flipping bits and reporting the resulting array. The details of the mechanism can be
found in the original paper, but for completeness we also present them in Appendix E.
In the paper introducing RAPPOR, the authors mention that preventing tracking of users is an
issue with their construction: “RAPPOR responses can even affect client anonymity, when they are
collected on immutable client values that are the same across all clients: if the responses contain
too many bits (e.g. the Bloom filters are too large), this can facilitate tracking clients, since the
bits of the Permanent randomized responses are correlated”. On the other hand, when talking
about the reason behind the second phase of the mechanism execution, generating a report from
the permanent randomization, they mention that “Instead of directly reporting B′ [The Permanent
Randomization] on every request, the client reports a randomized version of B′. This modification
significantly increases the difficulty of tracking a client based on B′, which could otherwise be viewed
as a unique identifier in longitudinal reporting scenarios”. We wish to show that in our framework,
using the same parameters they used in the RAPPOR data collections, RAPPOR is more aligned
with the first statement than with the second. We analyzed RAPPOR’s untrackable parameter in
the worst case setting, which can be found in Appendix E.2. We present an analysis of the “average
case” behavior of RAPPOR.
5.1 Estimated Percentile of the Trackability Random Varaible
We estimate the statistics of the trackabiltiy random variable for RAPPOR. In essence, the track-
ability random variable is the distribution of trackability leaks that happen when participating in
the mechanism. The pure version of the untrackable bound in Definition 3.5 is an upper bound on
the possible values of the trackability random variable.
Formally, denote the RAPPOR mechanism by R. For k reports we define a vector of par-
titions ~J = {Ji}i∈[k], where Ji = [i]. We also define two report vectors ~T = {Ti}i∈[k] and
~T ′ = {T ′i}i∈[k], where Ti is drawn from the product distribution
(
GRi (u) , G
R
n−i (u)
)
and all of
11
the T ′i are drawn from G
R
n (u). The trackability random variable for k reports is the value:
τ := max
{
max
i∈[⌊ k2 ⌋]
CTi,Ji, max
i∈[⌊k2 ⌋]
CT ′i ,Ji
}
, where CT,J is as defined in Appendix E.2:
CT,J :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln Pr
[
GRn (u) = T
]
Pr
[
GR|J | (u) = TJ
]
· Pr
[
GRn−|J | (u) = TJ∁
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
The random variable τ is the maximum measured tracking for the
⌊
k
2
⌋
cases where the reports are
generated by two users and the
⌊
k
2
⌋
cases where the reports are generated by one user. In our
setting a mechanism should protect against both types of cases.
The measures of interest are percentiles of the trackability random variable distribution. We
estimate the median and the 90th percentile of the trackability random variable. Appendix E.4
presents the details of the estimation process.
Figure 4, in Appendix E, shows the estimated median and 90th percentile of the Trackability
random variable for between 2 and 15 reports, and their respective 95% confidence interval. Our
estimation shows that RAPPOR’s trackability random variable’s median is better than the worst
case trackability, but reaches high values, around 5 after as few as 10 reports. The 90th percentile
is worse, reaching trackability of 5 after as little as 7 reports.
6 Bitwise Everlasting Privacy Mechanism
We present a mechanism for collecting statistics about the distribution of a single bit in the popu-
lation, in such a way that everlasting privacy is maintained. Our mechanism is a permanent state
one, using a state that consists of a noisy copy of the private bit. At each report, the user sends a
noisy version of the state, effectively sending a doubly noisy version of their private bit. We show
the mechanism achieves good accuracy, and reasonable everlasting privacy. Since this mechanism
is a permanent state mechanism, we can use Theorem 3.9 to give a less than reasonable upper
bound on the untrackable parameter of this mechanism. We show, however a lower bound of the
untrackable parameter of this mechanism that is not far off from the upper bound in Theorem 3.9.
Consider the mechanism where each user holds one bit, b. First they generate a permanent
randomization, b′ = b⊕ x, where x ∼ Ber
(
1
eε1+1
)
. Then at each report they generate a report bit,
r = b′⊕y, where y ∼ Ber
(
1
eε2+1
)
. The aggregator receives these reports from all users and invokes
the frequency oracle to output an estimate:
p˜0 =
eε1+ε2 + 1− (eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)∑i∈[n] ri
(eε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
and p˜1 = 1− p˜0. Let p˜ be the vector whose coordinates are p˜0 and p˜1. Let p be the vector of true
frequencies.
6.1 Privacy, Accuracy and Trackability
Bitwise Everlasting Privacy is ε1-EDP, outputs p˜ such that with probability 1− β:∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ (ε1 + 2) (ε2 + 2)ε1 · ε2
√
32 ln (2/β)
n
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and is
⌊
k
2
⌋
ε2-Untrackable, but no better than
k
2ε2−ε1− ln 2-Untrackable. The proof of these claims
can be found in Appendix F.
7 Report Noisy Inner Product
In this section we present a method for collecting statistics about users’ data when it is encoded
in a vector of d bits. This mechanism allows us to solve the heavy hitters or histograms problems,
while maintaining everlasting privacy. This solution achieves good accuracy with high probability
and is effectively untrackable with high probability, but only for a “not so large” number of reports
(where “not so large” is approximately the square root of the number of vectors in the state).
The “delta” part of the untrackable bound of this solution can be small, but most likely not
cryptographically small. While in Differential Privacy one should make sure the “delta” part is
cryptographically small, it is not clear whether or not the same requirement applies to the framework
of tracking.
The construction of this mechanism follows a general transformation from a Locally Differential
Privacy mechanism to an Everlasting Privacy mechanism with certain trackability parameters:
memorize a fixed number (L) of executions of a local privacy preserving computation. At each
collection the mechanism mimics one of these stored executions, choosing one of them at random.
Everlasting Privacy is maintained by the finite access to a user’s data: only L total different
executions are ever available to the adversary. On the other hand, in terms of trackability, as long
as no two different stored execution are played, there is no difference between one user and two
users. No guarantees are given if the same stored execution is chosen twice.
In our instantiation of this idea, Report Noisy Inner Product is based on creating a state that
contains random d-bit vectors as well as their noisy inner product with the user’s private value.
In this setting there are n users. Let:
ε′ :=
ε
2
√
2L ln
(
1
δ
)
At initialization, every user i, with private value ui ∈ {0, 1}d chooses L random vectors
{vi,j}j∈[L], vi,j ∈ {0, 1}d \ {~0}, and L noisy bits {xi,j}j∈[L] such that xi,j ∼ Ber
(
1
eε′+1
)
and
calculates bi,j = 〈vi,j , ui〉 ⊕ xi,j.
At each time of collection, every user j picks at random a vector from the state generated in the
previous step. That is, they choose one of the vi’s generated before and the corresponding result
of the inner product si. They then send it to the server. We refer to the report user i sends at
a given collection time as (Vi, Bi) (i.e. the vector and the noisy inner product). The aggregator
receives these reports from all users and invokes the frequency oracle to output an estimate:
p˜u :=
2d − 1
2dn
eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1
∑
i∈[n]
(−1)〈Vi, u〉⊕Bi + 1
2d
Since we never choose the vector ~0 as one of the vectors of the state, we introduce a small bias
to the probability that a report will agree with any other value than the one used to generate it.
This bias is corrected by the multiplicative 2
d−1
2d
factor and the additive 1
2d
factor, resulting in an
unbiased estimator.
Let p be the entire true frequency vector and p˜ as the entire estimated frequency vector.
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7.1 Privacy, Accuracy and Trackability
The mechanism Report Noisy Inner Product (RNIP) maintains (ε, δ)-Approximate Everlasting
Privacy, outputs p˜ such that with probability 1− β:
∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ ε′ + 2ε′
√
8 ln(2d+1/β)
n
= O
(√
ln(2d+1/β) ln(1/δ)L
nε2
)
And it is
(
0, k
2
L +
L2
2d
)
-untrackable for k reports.
The proofs of these claims can be found in Appendix G and are similar to the analysis in [18].
7.2 Parameter Selection
When deploying this mechanism, the significant parameters considered are the everlasting privacy
and desired accuracy. In our setting we have n users and our data consists of values that can
be encoded into d bits. Assume we wish to have everlasting privacy (ε, δ) and accuracy α with
probability 1 − β. By the analysis of the accuracy made in Section G.2, the required value of the
Differential Privacy parameter of every report, which we denoted ε′, needs to be at least
2
√
2 ln(2d+1/β)
α · √n−
√
2 ln(2d+1/β)
.
For most interesting settings we can assume that α > 2
√
2 ln(2d+1/β)
n , which allows us to choose
ε′ = 4α
√
2 ln(2d+1/β)
n . Once we have ε
′ we can say that the mechanism needs to have a state of size
at most L =
⌊
ε2
8ε′2 ln(1/δ)
⌋
. This means that the mechanism is
(
0, k
2
L
)
-Untrackable for k reports.
To summarize, if we were to require (ε, δ)-Everlasting Privacy and α accuracy with probability
at least 1− β, then for k reports we can guarantee:(
0, O˜
(
k2
α2ε2n
))
-Untrackable
where the O˜ hides the logarithmic factors in the relaxation parameter for differential privacy δ, the
failure probability β and the size of the vectors d.
8 Conclusions and Open Problems
The issue of using differentially private mechanisms in order to track users is a newly formulated
problem. While avoiding tracking is very natural, it has not been investigated before in a formal
manner. The notion of Everlasting Privacy is very tempting, and indeed, some companies imple-
mented and deployed it. But Everlasting Privacy should be handled with caution; We have shown
that one such deployment of Everlasting Privacy left much to be desired in terms of the untrackable
parameter. The risks of tracking are real, and as such every mechanism deployed to a user base
must try to prevent it as much as it can.
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Many questions concerning tracking are open and the results presented here should be treated
as a preliminary investigation. The most important one is how do you combine the constraints
on accuracy and on everlasting differential privacy to produce a lower bound on the untrackable
parameter. In particular, are the schemes of Sections 6 and 7 the best one can hope for, or are
there better mechanisms? One downside of the scheme of Section 7 is the rapid deterioration in
the untrackable parameter once k reaches
√
L. Is there a scheme with a more graceful degradation
of the untrackable parameter?
The mechanisms we presented are permanent state mechanisms. Perhaps mechanisms which
transform the state between executions can achieve better untrackable parameter bounds? Doing
such a construction is delicate, since if not done correctly one of two things might happen:
1. The Differential Privacy guarantee will decline the more the state alters.
2. The accuracy will decline, as many different inputs might converge to the same states over
time.
But perhaps a clever construction of a mechanism that transforms its state can achieve a much
better untrackable parameter bound for given Differential Privacy and accuracy requirements.
Also, perhaps everlasting privacy is an unreasonable demand. A mechanism that achieves
privacy for many executions, but not for infinite executions, can be very suitable for practical
purposes as well. If so, how can we extend these results to these “long-lasting” privacy mechanisms?
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A Chernoff Bounds
We use in some proofs the additive Chernoff bound. We use a slightly easier to work with version
of Corollary A.1.7 of [1].
Theorem A.1. Let a > 0. Let X1, ...,Xn be random variables, where each Xi is drawn indepen-
dently from a Bernoulli distribution. Denote with X the average of all Xi. The probability the dis-
tance between X and its expectation is larger than a is bounded by Pr
[∣∣X − E [X]∣∣ > a] ≤ 2e−2n·a2
B Proofs for Section 3
B.1 Proof for Theorem 3.8
Proof. The proof follows directly from the definitions of everlasting privacy, untrackable and un-
detectability, by simply plugging in the bound from everlasting privacy in the bounds from the
untrackable definition.
For the first direction notice that:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ eγ · Pr [GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ] · Pr [GMk−|J | (u) ∈ TJ∁]+ δ
≤ eγ · Pr
[
GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ
]
·
(
eǫPr
[
GMk−|J |
(
u′
) ∈ TJ∁]+ δ′)+ δ
≤ eγ+ǫ · Pr
[
GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J |
(
u′
) ∈ TJ∁]+ δ + eγδ′
≤ eγ+ǫ · Pr
[
GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J |
(
u′
) ∈ TJ∁]+ δmax
Where the first inequality is due to the definition of untrackable and the second inequality is due
to the definition of Everlasting Privacy. For the second direction notice that:
e−ε
(
Pr
[
GMk−|J |
(
u′
) ∈ TJ∁]− δ′) ≤ Pr [GMk−|J | (u) ∈ TJ∁]
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Which means that:
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ
]
· e−ε
(
Pr
[
GMk−|J |
(
u′
) ∈ TJ∁]− δ′) ≤ eγPr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]+ δ
And so:
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) ∈ TJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J |
(
u′
) ∈ TJ∁] ≤ eγ+εPr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]+ eεδ + δ′
≤ eγ+εPr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]+ δmax
B.2 Proof for Theorem 3.9
Proof. To prove this upper bound we have to prove that the two ratios in the definition of untrack-
able are upper bounded by e⌊k2⌋ε. Since we are talking about pure untrackable, it suffices for us
to show that the bound holds for any output stream. Namely, we will consider individual output
streams t ∈ Rk as opposed to sets of report streams T ⊆ Rk, and show that for them the following
bound holds:
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) = tJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J | (u) = tJ∁
]
Pr
[
GMk (u) = t
] ≤ e⌊ k2⌋ε
and
Pr
[
GMk (u) = t
]
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) = tJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J | (u) = tJ∁
] ≤ e⌊ k2⌋ε.
Since this mechanism is a Permanent State Mechanism, if its possible states are S, then we have
that:
Pr
[
GMk (u) = t
]
=
∑
s∈S
Pr [State is s]Pr [Reports are t | State is s]
Denote the first probability (that for a user with private data u, the permanent state is s) with pus
and the second probability (that a user with permanent state s will output reports t) with qst . The
fact that we have a permanent state mechanism leads to the equality:
qst = q
s
tJ · qstJ∁
Let j be the size of J and hence J∁ is of size k− j. W.l.o.g. assume that j ≤ k2 , (otherwise swap J
and J∁).
We prove a slightly stronger bound, that if J is of size j, then the ratios are bounded by ejε.
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For the first ratio, let s⋆ = argmin
s∈S
{
qstJ
}
. We can bound the ratio as:
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) = tJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J | (u) = tJ∁
]
Pr
[
GMk (u) = t
] =
(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
tJ
)(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
t
J∁
)
∑
s∈S
pus q
s
tJ
qst
J∁
≤
(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
tJ
)(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
t
J∁
)
qs
⋆
tJ
∑
s∈S
pusq
s
t
J∁
≤
ejεqs
⋆
tJ
(∑
s∈S
pus
)(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
t
J∁
)
qs
⋆
tJ
∑
s∈S
pusq
s
t
J∁
= ejε
The first inequality is due to the definition of s⋆, the second inequality is due to the fact that the
process of generating a report from a state is ε-DP and the report size is j.
For the second ratio, let s⋆ = argmax
s∈S
{
qstJ
}
. We can bound the ratio as:
Pr
[
GMk (u) = t
]
Pr
[
GM|J | (u) = tJ
]
· Pr
[
GMk−|J | (u) = tJ∁
] =
∑
s∈S
pus q
s
tJ
qst
J∁(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
tJ
)(∑
s∈S
pusps,tJ∁
)
≤
qs
⋆
tJ
∑
s∈S
pus q
s
t
J∁(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
tJ
)(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
t
J∁
)
≤
qs
⋆
tJ
∑
s∈S
pusq
s
t
J∁
e−jεqs⋆tJ
(∑
s∈S
pus
)(∑
s∈S
pus q
s
t
J∁
)
= ejε
The first inequality is due to the definition of s⋆, the second inequality is due to the fact that the
process of generating a report from a state is ε-DP and the report size is j.
Since the maximal possible j is
⌊
k
2
⌋
, we have that for all J the ratios are bounded by e⌊k2⌋ε and
so the mechanism is
⌊
k
2
⌋
ε-untrackable.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3.10
First, we properly define the composition of m mechanisms, {Mi}i∈[m]. In our setting a user
generate m report streams using the m mechanisms. Namely, each Mi was used to generate ki
reports. Let the sum of all ki’s be k. Let M̂ be the composition of all the Mi’s. Formally, M̂ will
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first generate k1 reports from the report stream generator of M1, it will then continue to generate
k2 reports from the report stream generator of M2, and so on, until all k reports were generated.
Let the indices of the reports generated by Mi be Ji, i.e. J1 = {1, ..., k1}, J2 = {k1 + 1, ..., k1 + k2},
and so on. Notice that the probability that GM̂k , on input u, will generate a report stream t of k
reports is exactly:
Pr
[
GM̂k (u) = t
]
=
∏
i∈[m]
Pr
[
GMiki (u) = tJi
]
since all mechanisms Mi are executed independently.
We are now ready to prove Theorem B.3.
Proof. In the definition of untrackable, we consider whether a set of reports were generated by
a single user or two, according to any partition. To prove that the composition mechanism is
(γ′,mδ + δ′)-untrackable we will prove that the bound in the definition holds for every partition
possible.
Consider the partition P = {P1, P2} of all the reports generated by M̂ , where P1 are the reports
associated with the first user and P2 are the reports associated with the second. We will split this
partition into partitions for each mechanism separately. Namely, for every Mi we define a partition
P i =
{
P i1, P
i
2
}
, such that each P i1 = P1 ∩ Ji and similarly for P i2. The partition P i is exactly the
partition on reports generated by Mi induced by P . Notice that we allow P
i
1 (or P
i
2) to be empty.
Consider new mechanisms {Fi}i∈[m]. that each receives as input a bit b. For every Fi, If b = 0
the mechanism outputs a stream generated by one copy of Mi, and if b = 1 the mechanism outputs
a stream generated by two independent copies ofMi according to partition Pi. If either P
i
1 or P
i
2 are
empty, the output Fi will not depend on its input b. If the Mi’s are (γ, δ)-untrackable then the Fi’s
are (γ, δ)-differentially private. This allows us to use Advanced Composition for differential privacy
(Theorem 2.2) to say that the m-fold composition of all of the Fi’s is (γ
′,mδ + δ′)-differentially
private for γ′ as is in the theorem statement. Notice that conditioned on all mechanisms receiving
input 1, the output product distribution over reports is identical to the case where all reports,
for each mechanism, were generated by two users. Similarly if all inputs are 0, the output prod-
uct distribution over reports is identical to the case where all reports, for each mechanism, were
generated by one user. This implies that the composition of the original Mi’s, M̂ , is (γ
′,mδ + δ′)-
untrackable.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3.12
Proof. The proof for this theorem is very intuitive. Since the mechanism is γ-untrackable for k
reports, it is also γ-untrackable for fewer reports. This teaches us that by paying no more than γ
we can reduce the question of being untrackable for n users to the question of being untrackable for
n− 1 users. Continuing this until we have 2 users costs us (n− 2) γ to the untrackable parameter,
resulting in a total of (n− 1) γ untrackable.
Formally, we prove this by induction. Assume that a mechanism M is (t− 1) γ-untrackable for
t users for k reports. We wish to prove that the mechanism M is tγ-untrackable for t+ 1 users for
k reports. The base case, t = 2, follows directly from the fact that the mechanism is γ-untrackable
for k reports.
If the mechanism M is γ-untrackable for k reports, then it is γ-untrackable for fewer reports as
well. We denote Pr [A] := Pr
[
GM|A| (u) ∈ TA
]
. Notice that for all user data u ∈ U , all partitions
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P = {Pi}i∈[t+1] of [k] into t+ 1 parts and all output stream sets T ⊆ Rk:∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj ] = Pr [P1] · Pr [P2] ·
∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr [Pj ]
≤ eγPr [P1 ∪ P2]
∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr
[
GM|Pj | (u) ∈ TPj
]
≤ etγPr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]
Where the first inequality is due to the mechanism being γ-untrackable for |P1|+ |P2| reports and
the second inequality is due to the induction hypothesis.
Similarly, in the other direction:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ e(t−1)γPr [P1 ∪ P2] ∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr [Pj ]
≤ etγPr [P1] · Pr [P2] ·
∏
j∈[t+1]\{1,2}
Pr [Pj ]
= etγ
∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj ]
Where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis and the second inequality is due to
the mechanism being γ-untrackable for |P1|+ |P2| reports.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.13
Proof. The proof for this is also rather intuitive. Theorem 3.9 teaches us that we can exchange the
probability that two sets of reports, of size totaling k′, originated from two users to the probability
they originated from one user by paying no more than
⌊
k′
2
⌋
ε in the untrackable parameter. By
combining pairs of users, we can use this to reduce the question of being untrackable for n users
to the question of untrackable for
⌈
n
2
⌉
users, by paying no more than
⌊
k
2
⌋
ε. By repeating this
process ⌈log n⌉ − 1 times we can reduce the question of untrackable for n users to the question of
untrackable for 2 users, by paying no more than ⌈log n⌉⌊k2⌋ε.
Formally, we prove this by induction. Assume that the mechanism is ⌈log t⌉⌊k2⌋γ-untrackable
for t users for k reports. We wish to prove that the mechanism is ⌈log (t+ 1)⌉⌊k2⌋γ-untrackable for
t+ 1 users for k reports. The base case t = 2 follows directly from the fact that the mechanism is
γ-untrackable for k reports.
Assume t is odd. The proof is very similar when it is even, but for simplicity we will only show
it for odd values of t. We denote ℓ := ⌈log (t+ 1)⌉ and use the same notation for Pr [A] as before.
Notice that for all user data u ∈ U , all partitions P = {Pi}i∈[t+1] of [k] into t + 1 parts and all
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output stream sets T ⊆ Rk:∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj ] =
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [P2j ] · Pr [P2j+1]
≤
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
e
⌊ |P2j∪P2j+1|
2
⌋
γ
Pr [P2j ∪ P2j+1]
≤ e⌊ k2⌋γ
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [p2j ∪ P2j+1]
≤ eℓ⌊ k2⌋γPr [GMk (u) ∈ T ]
Where the first inequality is due to Theorem 3.9 and the third inequality is due to the induction
hypothesis.
Similarly, for the other direction:
Pr
[
GMk (u) ∈ T
] ≤ e(ℓ−1)⌊ k2⌋γ ∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [P2j ∪ P2j+1]
≤ eℓ⌊ k2⌋γ
∏
j∈[ t+12 ]
Pr [P2j ] · Pr [P2j+1]
= eℓ⌊ k2⌋γ
∏
j∈[t+1]
Pr [Pj]
Where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis and the second inequality is due
to Theorem 3.9.
C Mechanism Chaining Generalized Definitions
C.1 Mechanism Chaining Definition for Multiple Mechanisms
The second setting we examine is the chaining of k mechanisms. Here the definition follows the
same pattern as the previous definition; chaining k mechanisms is done by taking the output of
each mechanism and using it as the input of the next. An equivalent way to think about it is
by recursively applying the previous definition on the k mechanisms: Take two mechanisms and
transform them to a single mechanism by chaining them. Now repeat the process with the resulting
mechanism and the next one and so forth.
Definition C.1 (k Local Mechanism Chaining). Given k mechanisms Ai : Vi → Vi+1, the k
chaining of these mechanisms M ©
i∈[k]
Ai : V1 → Vk+1 is defined as M ©
i∈[k]
Ai (u) = Ak (...A1 (u) ...), or
recursively, as:
M ©
i∈[k]
Ai (u) = Ak
(
M ©
i∈[k−1]
Ai (u)
)
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C.2 Mechanism Chaining Definition for the Non-Local Case
Before delving into the specifics of this definition we first give an example. Assume we wanted
to do a nationwide research on people’s sleeping habits. One way we might implement it is by
doing a hierarchy of mechanism sets. The first mechanism set is the personal one, where each
individual generates a report by applying a mechanism from this set on their own data. The
second mechanism set is the familial mechanism set, where each family generates a familial report
by applying a mechanism from this set on the reports generated on each of its members. The third
mechanism set is the cities mechanism set, where each city generates a city report by applying a
mechanism from this set on the reports generated by each family in the city. We continue on like
this, defining the country, continent and finally global mechanism sets. The resulting interactions
between these sets and the inputs is the general definition of mechanism chaining.
A different way to think of this is by considering the set of inputs, i.e. the users’ private
information database. By partitioning of this “input” database and a set of mechanisms, we
construct a new ”output” database where each entry is the output of a mechanism from this set
on a section of the partition of the “input” database (where each section of the “input” database’s
partition is used once and only once in the creation of a new entry). We repeat this procedure by
using the “output” database of the previous stage as the “input” database of the current stage.
Note that in this definition we require neither the mechanisms of each set to be the same (or even
to uphold the same Differential Privacy guarantee) nor that the final “output” database is of size
1.
Definition C.2 (k Mechanism Chaining). Given k sets of mechanisms Mi = {Mi,j} and a k
Partitions P i such that
[∣∣P i∣∣] = ⋃
j
P i+1j , where each Mi,j :
∏
ℓ∈P ij
Vi,ℓ 7→ Vi+1,j, the k chaining of
these sets mechanisms M ©
i∈[k]
Mi :
∏
j
V1,j 7→
∏
j
Vk+1,j is defined recursively as
M ©
i∈[k]
Mi (D) =
(
Mk,1
(
M ©
i∈[k−1]
Mi (D)
)
, . . . ,M
k,
∣∣P k∣∣
(
M ©
i∈[k−1]
Mi (D)
))
D Proofs for Section 4
Figure 1: Illustration of the transition probabilities for going from input u ∈ U to output s ∈ O
through V , V being of size k
u
v1
v2
vk
s
...
pv1
pv2
pvk
gv1s
gv2s
gvks
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Let pv be Pr [A (u) = v] and g
v
s be Pr [B (v) = s]. Figure 1 displays the transition probabilities
for going from any input u to a middle output v and from v to output s. This shows us that the
probability of going from u to s is:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s] =
∑
v∈V
pvg
v
s
D.1 Proof for Theorem 4.2
Proof. The proof consists of proving that the chained mechanism is both ε1-LDP and ε2-LDP. The
fact that the mechanism is ε1-LDP is a direct result of B being a post-processing of the result of A.
The proof that the mechanism is ε2-LDP is a bit trickier. We consider the separation of the
probability of sending u to s into the sum of the multiplications of sending u to d and sending v to
s for all v ∈ V , namely:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s] =
∑
v∈V
Pr [A (u) = v] · Pr [B (v) = s]
We can replace Pr [B (v) = s] with the minimal one of those min
v′∈V
{Pr [B (v′) = s]} by paying no
more than an eε2 multiplicative value, reducing all of the B contribution to the sum to a constant.
Since what remains is simply a summation of the probabilities of moving from u to v, which sums
up to 1, we can simply replace u with u′. Finally, we can replace min
v′∈V
{Pr [B (v′) = s]} with the
corresponding original Pr [B (v) = s] without paying anything, completing the proof. Formally:
Pr [MB◦A (u) ∈ S] =
∑
s∈S
(∑
v∈V
Pr [A (u) = v] · Pr [B (v) = s]
)
≤
∑
s∈S
(∑
v∈V
Pr [A (u) = v] · eε2 · min
v′∈V
{
Pr
[
B
(
v′
)
= s
]})
= eε2 ·
∑
s∈S
(∑
v∈V
Pr
[
A
(
u′
)
= v
] · min
v′∈V
{
Pr
[
B
(
v′
)
= s
]})
≤ eε2 ·
∑
s∈S
(∑
v∈V
Pr
[
A
(
u′
)
= v
] · Pr [B (v) = s])
= eε2Pr
[MB◦A (u′) ∈ S]
And so MB◦A is ε2-LDP and is therefore min {ε1, ε2}-LDP.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
The proof is by induction over the size of the set of possible outputs of the first mechanism that
the bound holds. First, let us prove the base case where the size of the set of all possible outputs
of the first mechanism is 2. The proof begins in a general construction of such a mechanism and
shows that the worst possible Differential Privacy guarantee is achieved when each mechanism is
similar to a biased coin toss that has the required LDP guarantee (e.g. if the mechanism is ε-LDP
then the worst case Differential Privacy guarantee is achieved when the mechanism outputs one
output w.p. e
ε
eε+1).
24
Lemma D.1. Given two mechanisms A : U → V and B : V → O that are ε1-LDP and ε2-LDP
respectively, and given that |V |=2 we have that MB◦A : U → O is ln eε1+ε2+1eε1+eε2 -LDP.
Proof. Let V = {v,w} and let:
pv := Pr [A (u) = v]
qv := Pr
[
A
(
u′
)
= v
]
gvs := Pr [B (v) = s]
and similarly for w (the other element in V ). The proof first shows that the worst case differential
privacy happens when pv =
eε1
1+eε1 and qv =
1
1+eε1 . The proof simply uses straightforward calculus
to show that the differential privacy is the worst when both the ratios are
∣∣log pvqv ∣∣ = eε1 and∣∣log 1−pv1−qv ∣∣ = eε1 , i.e. the ε1-LDP constraint is tight everywhere. To see this notice that for all
outputs s ∈ O and pairs of user inputs u, u′ ∈ U we have that:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] =
pv · gvs + (1− pv) · gws
qv · gvs + (1− qv) · gws
Assume w.l.o.g. that gvs ≥ gws , which means that this ratio only increases as pv increases and qv
decreases. Specifically, for each value of pv we have that the ratio is maximized when qv is as small
as it can get, subject to ε1-LDP. The lower bounds on qv from the ε1-LDP conditions are:
qv ≥ 1
eε1
· pv
And
1− qv ≤ eε1 · (1− pv)
Which is equivalent to:
qv ≥ eε1pv − eε1 + 1
And so the worst case in terms of differential privacy happens when:
qv = max
{
1
eε1
· pv, eε1pv − eε1 + 1
}
And so the minimal value of qv is
1
eε1 · pv when:
1
eε1
· pv ≥ eε1pv − eε1 + 1
Which is equivalent to:
pv ≤ e
ε1
eε1 + 1
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On the other hand, minimal value of qv is e
ε1pv − eε1 + 1 when:
pv ≥ e
ε1
eε1 + 1
Let’s split this into two cases: When pv ≤ eε1eε1+1 we have that:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] =
pv · gvs + (1− pv) · gws
qv · gvs + (1− qv) · gws
≥ pv · g
v
s + (1− pv) · gws(
1
eε1 · pv
) · gvs + (1− 1eε1 · pv) · gws
Call the last expression f1. If we want to minimize f we have that:
∂
∂pv
f1 =
gws e
ε1 (gvs − gws ) (eε1 − 1)((
1
eε1 · pv
) · gvs + (1− 1eε1 · pv) · gws )2
Both the numerator and the denominator are positive (given that gvs ≥ gws , which we assumed
w.l.o.g.), and so this function only increases as the value of pv increases.
Examining the case when pv ≥ eε1eε1+1 we have that:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] =
pv · gvs + (1− pv) · gws
qv · gvs + (1− qv) · gws
≤ pv · g
v
s + (1− pv) · gws
(eε1pv − eε1 + 1) · gvs + (eε1 − eε1pv) · gws
and similarly call the last expression f2. If we want to minimize f we have that:
∂
∂pv
f2 =
gvs (g
w
s − gvs ) (eε1 − 1)
((eε1pv − eε1 + 1) · gvs + (eε1 − eε1pv) · gws )2
This is always negative (given that gvs ≥ gws , which we assumed w.l.o.g.), and so this function only
increases as the value of pv decreases. So in both cases we get that the value is maximized when
pv is on its boundary, i.e. pv =
eε1
eε1+1 and so qv =
1
eε1+1 . This means that:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] =
pv · gvs + (1− pv) · gws
qv · gvs + (1− qv) · gws
≤ e
ε1 · gvs + gws
gvs + e
ε1 · gws
We know that gws ≥ 1eε2 gvs and that the ratio only increases as gws decreases, resulting in:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] ≤
eε1 · gvs + gws
gvs + e
ε1 · gws
≤ e
ε1 · gvs + 1eε2 gvs
gvs + e
ε1 · 1
eε2
gvs
=
eε1+ε2 + 1
eε2 + eε1
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The proof for general sizes of V relies on two facts:
Fact D.2. For all a, b, c, d > 0 we have that: ab ≤ cd ⇔ a+cb+d ≥ ab
Fact D.3. For all a, b, c, d > 0, b > d we have that ab ≥ cd ⇔ a−cb−d ≥ ab
For completeness we show their proof at Section D.3.
We are now ready to prove our advanced upper bound for general V . We use induction over
the size of the set of all possible outputs of the first mechanism. For every two user inputs, the
reduction will find two elements a, b ∈ V , s.t. if we were to output b whenever we were supposed to
output a for both user inputs, the Differential Privacy guarantee of the chaining will only weaken.
This would allow both mechanisms to maintain their original Differential Privacy guarantee and
so they will have the same structure as the one in the induction hypothesis, and so the reduction
holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We prove this using induction on the size of V . Lemma D.1 proves the base
case, where |V | = 2. Assume the statement is true for |V | = k ≥ 2. For |V | = k + 1, using the
same notation as in Lemma D.1 we have that ∀s ∈ O, ∀u, u′ ∈ U , the ratio between the probability
of seeing output s, given that the input was u and the probability of seeing output s, given that
input was u′ is:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] =
∑
v∈V
pv · gvs∑
v∈V
qv · gvs
We first show that there always exist a, b ∈ V where a 6= b s.t. the ratio mentioned before is upper
bounded by:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] ≤
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
Then we show that the right hand side is equal to:
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u) = s]
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u′) = s]
For some Aˆ and Bˆ, for which the induction hypothesis holds. If there exist a, b ∈ V s.t. gas = gbs
then:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] =
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
Else, we have that ∀a, b ∈ V : gas 6= gbs.
Since
∣∣V ∣∣ ≥ 3 we have that we can choose a ∈ V s.t. a /∈ {argmax
v∈V
{gvs} , argmin
v∈V
{gvs}
}
, i.e. gas
is not the maximal, nor the minimal, of all gvs . From here, we are going to construct a mechanism
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Bˆ which is the same as B, but without the element a in its domain, and a mechanism Aˆ that would
mimic A except for where A would output a, Aˆ would output b. b will be either argmax
v∈V
{gvs} or
argmin
v∈V
{gvs} such that the resulting ratio
Pr[MBˆ◦Aˆ(u)=s]
Pr[MBˆ◦Aˆ(u′)=s]
will be at least as big as Pr[MB◦A(u)=s]Pr[MB◦A(u′)=s] .
Figure 2 demonstrates this behavior.
Figure 2: Visualization of the constructions of Aˆ and Bˆ.
u
v1
b
a
vk
s
...
pa
Aˆ Bˆ
pv1
pb
pvk
gv1s
gbs
gvks
The way we are going to prove this is by examining:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] =
∑
v∈V
pv · gvs∑
v∈V
qv · gvs
This is a ratio of weighted sums, where each pv and qv have the same weight g
v
s . We use the nice
property that by increasing the weight gvs the ratio of weighted sums cannot become further from
pv
qv
, and if we were to decrease the weight gvs it cannot become nearer. Facts D.2 and D.3 give us a
technical way to leverage these behaviors. All in all, this allows us to exchange gas with g
b
s for the
right b such that we have not pushed the ratio of the weighted sums to decrease at all.
Case 1:
pa
qa
≥
∑
v∈V
pv · gvs∑
v∈V
qv · gvs
In this case we wish to not push the ratio further from paqa . This means that we should choose
b = argmax
v∈V
{gvs}. Now we have that:
(
gbs − gas
)
> 0, and so we can say that
(
gbs − gas
)
pa > 0 and
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(
gbs − gas
)
qa > 0. And so: (
gbs − gas
)
pa
(gbs − gas ) qa
=
pa
qa
≥
∑
v∈V
pv · gvs∑
v∈V
qv · gvs
Now, using Fact D.2 (replacing parameter a with
∑
v∈V
pv ·gvs , parameter b with
∑
v∈V
qv ·gvs , parameter
c with
(
gbs − gas
)
pa and parameter d with
(
gbs − gas
)
qa) we have that:∑
v∈V
pv · gvs∑
v∈V
qv · gvs
≤
∑
v∈V
pv · gvs +
(
gbs − gas
)
pa∑
v∈V
qv · gvs + (gbs − gas ) qa
=
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
Case 2:
pa
qa
≤
∑
v∈V
pv · gvs∑
v∈V
qv · gvs
In this case we wish to not push the ratio closer to paqa . This means that we should choose b =
argmin
v∈V
{gvs}. And so we have that:
(
gas − gbs
)
> 0, resulting in
(
gas − gbs
)
pa > 0 and
(
gas − gbs
)
qa >
0. Note also that: ∑
v∈V
qv · gvs −
(
gas − gbs
)
qa =
∑
v∈V
qv · gvs +
(
gbs − gas
)
qa∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
> 0
We now use Fact D.3 (replacing parameter a with
∑
v∈V
pv ·gvs , parameter b with
∑
v∈V
qv ·gvs , parameter
c with
(
gas − gbs
)
pa and parameter d with
(
gas − gbs
)
qa) to get that:∑
v∈V
pv · gvs∑
v∈V
qv · gvs
≤
∑
v∈V
pv · gvs −
(
gas − gbs
)
pa∑
v∈V
qv · gvs − (gas − gbs) qa
=
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
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And so we have proven that there always exist a, b ∈ V, a 6= b s.t.:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] ≤
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
We now construct two mechanisms Aˆ and Bˆ that hold the induction hypothesis and have:
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u) = s]
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u′) = s] =
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
The first mechanism is Aˆ : U → V \ {a} s.t. ∀u ∈ U we have that:
Pr
[
Aˆ (u) = v
]
=
{
pv for v ∈ V \ {a, b}
pa + pb otherwise
And similarly for qv. Notice that for all u, u
′ we have that ∀v ∈ V \ {a, b} the ratio between the
probability of having output v given that the input was u and the probability of having output v
given that the input was u′ is upper bounded by:
Pr
[
Aˆ (u) = v
]
Pr
[
Aˆ (u′) = v
] = pv
qv
≤ eε1
And
Pr
[
Aˆ (u) = b
]
Pr
[
Aˆ (u′) = b
] = pa + pb
qa + qa
≤ e
ε1qa + e
ε1qb
qa + qa
= eε1
And so Aˆ is ε1-LDP. Notice that this probability distribution is well defined, since ∀u ∈ U the
following equality holds:∑
v∈V \{a}
Pr
[
Aˆ (u) = v
]
=
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
Pr
[
Aˆ (u) = v
]
+ Pr
[
Aˆ (u) = b
]
=
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv + pa + pb
= 1
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We define Bˆ as Bˆ : V \ {a} → O s.t. ∀s ∈ O, ∀v ∈ V \ {a} we have that Pr
[
Bˆ (v) = s
]
= gvs . Notice
that this probability distribution is well defined, since ∀v ∈ V \ {a} the following equation holds:∑
s∈O
Pr
[
Bˆ (v) = s
]
=
∑
s∈O
gvs = 1
Notice that for all v, v′ we have that ∀s ∈ O:
Pr
[
Bˆ (v) = s
]
Pr
[
Bˆ (v′) = s
] = gvs
gv
′
s
≤ eε2
And so Bˆ is ε2-LDP.
We have that ∀u, u′ ∈ U , s ∈ O, using the chaining of mechanisms Aˆ and Bˆ, the ratio between
the probability of seeing output s given that the input was u and the probability of seeing output
s given that the input was u′ is:
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u) = s]
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u′) = s] =
∑
v∈V \{a}
Pr
[
Aˆ (u) = v
]
· Pr
[
Bˆ (v) = s
]
∑
v∈V \{a}
Pr
[
Aˆ (u′) = v
]
· Pr
[
Bˆ (v) = s
]
=
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
But since |V \ {a}| = k we can use the induction hypothesis to say that:
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u) = s]
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u′) = s] ≤ e
ε1+ε2 + 1
eε1 + eε2
And as we have proven before, ∃a, b ∈ V such that:
Pr [MB◦A (u) = s]
Pr [MB◦A (u′) = s] ≤
∑
v∈V \{a,b}
pv · gvs + (pa + pb) · gbs∑
v∈V \{a,b}
qv · gvs + (qa + qb) · gbs
=
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u) = s]
Pr
[MBˆ◦Aˆ (u′) = s]
≤ e
ε1+ε2 + 1
eε1 + eε2
Which means that MB◦A is ln eε1+ε2+1eε1+eε2 -LDP
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D.3 Proofs of Facts D.2 and D.3
For completeness we now present the proof of the two facts used in section 4.
Proof of D.2.
a
b
≤ c
d
⇔ ad ≤ cb
⇔ ad+ ab ≤ cb+ ab
⇔ a (b+ d) ≤ b (a+ c)
⇔ a
b
≤ a+ c
b+ d
Proof of D.3.
a
b
≥ c
d
⇔ ad ≥ cb
⇔ ad− ab ≥ cb− ab
⇔ a (d− b) ≤ b (c− a)
⇔ a
b
≤ c− a
d− b =
a− c
b− d
E Details of the Analyses of Section 5
E.1 RAPPOR Detailed Operation
RAPPOR is characterized by a few parameters:
• The so called Bloom filter array size, s.
• The number of hash functions in the Bloom filter, h.
• The probability of using a random bit instead of the bit from the Bloom filter in the permanent
randomization, f .
• p and q, the probabilities of outputting a bit 1 in the output given that the permanent
randomized Bloom filter’s bit was 0 and 1 respectively.
Let U be the set of all possible user values. Given h hash functions {Hi}i∈[h] and a Bloom filter
size s, ∀v ∈ U we define that:
∀j ∈ [s] : Bj =
{
1 ∃i ∈ [h] s.t. Hi (v) = j
0 otherwise
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The permanent randomized Bloom filter B′ is constructed by the values of B such that:
∀j ∈ [s] : B′j =

1 w.p. 12f
0 w.p. 12f
Bi w.p. 1− f
And finally the report is constructed with probabilities depending on the values of B′ such that:
∀j ∈ [s] : Pr [Sj = 1] =
{
p B′j = 0
q B′j = 1
Combining all of this we get that:
Pr [Sj = 1|Bj = 1] = p · Pr
[
B′j = 0|Bj = 1
]
+ q · Pr [B′j = 1|Bj = 1]
=
(
1− 1
2
f
)
q +
1
2
fp
and similarly we get that:
Pr [Sj = 1|Bj = 0] = p · Pr
[
B′j = 0|Bj = 0
]
+ q · Pr [B′j = 1|Bj = 0]
=
1
2
fq +
(
1− 1
2
f
)
p
E.2 Worst Case Untrackable Parameter Analysis of RAPPOR
As a warm up, we use both composition theorems to get an upper bound on the pure and approx-
imate untrackable parameters. Using theorem 3.9, we see that a 1-bit instance of RAPPOR, i.e.
one that has s = 1, is γ1-untrackable for k reports, where:
γ1 =
⌊
k
2
⌋
max
{
ln
∣∣p
q
∣∣, ln∣∣1− p
1− q
∣∣}
An s-bit instance of RAPPOR can be considered as the an s-fold composition of the 1-bit instance.
Using Basic Composition, we see that s-bit RAPPOR is γs-untrackable for k reports, where:
γs = s ·
⌊
k
2
⌋
max
{
ln
∣∣p
q
∣∣, ln∣∣1− p
1− q
∣∣}
Plugging in the parameters used in their paper, s = 128, p = 0.5, q = 0.75 we get that their
implementation is 88 · ⌊k2⌋-untrackable for k reports.
Alternatively, using Differential Privacy’s advanced composition, we see that s-bit RAPPOR is
(γ′s, δ′)-untrackable for k reports, where:
γ′s =
√
2s ln (1/δ′) · γ1 + s · γ1 (eγ1 − 1)
For the parameters of the paper, the eγ1 − 1 component of the advanced bound explodes in k,
making resulting in a worse bound than the one from Basic Composition.
But how does this compare to the best bound we can generate for RAPPOR? We begin by
showing a tight bound on the worst case untrackable parameter of RAPPOR for parameters used
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in the original paper. These tight bounds were computed by going over all possible values of a
small set of parameters that are sufficient to find the instance with the worst trackability. The first
parameter we enumerate over is the size of each report set, i.e. the size of the report set associated
with the first user. Fixing a size for each report set, we examine each position in the original Bloom
filter. We check what is the amount of 1’s in that position in the reports associated with the first
user and the second user seeking when the resulting untrackable parameter is maximized.
The calculation can be simplified since all the positions in the Bloom filter where the underlying
bit is 1 behave identically. The same can be said for positions where the underlying bit is 0. This
allows us to only consider one position of each. We calculate the contribution to the untrackable
parameter made by each position in the Bloom filter separately to easily find a report which
maximizes the ratio in the untrackable definition. From that report, we draw a tight untrackable
bound. This allows us to find the tight bound quickly, as we only need to enumerate over five
parameters, each having at most k different options, where k is the number of reports.
To better understand the procedure above, let CT,J be the trackability of a report set T with J
being the indices associated with one user. Essentially, CT,J is the lower bound on the untrackable
parameter that T and J induce for R:
CT,J =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln Pr
[
GRn (u) = T
]
Pr
[
GR|J | (u) = TJ
]
· Pr
[
GRn−|J | (u) = TJ∁
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Let i be the number of reports the set associated with the first user. Let x and y be the number of
1’s in the first and second sets of reports. We denote q⋆a,b := q
b (1− q)a−b, and similarly p⋆a,b. We
define C1 (i, x, y) as the contribution to trackability made by positions where the underlying Bloom
filter is 1. We define C0 similarly, only for position where the underlying Bloom filter is 0:
C1 (i, x, y) =
(
1
2fq
⋆
i,x +
(
1− 12f
)
p⋆i,x
)(
1
2fq
⋆
k−i,y +
(
1− 12f
)
p⋆k−i,y
)
1
2fq
⋆
k,x+y +
(
1− 12f
)
p⋆k,x+y
C0 (i, x, y) =
((
1− 12
)
fq⋆i,x +
1
2fp
⋆
i,x
)((
1− 12
)
fq⋆k−i,y +
1
2fp
⋆
k−i,y
)
(
1− 12
)
fq⋆k,x+y +
1
2fp
⋆
k,x+y
By examining the trackability of reports in RAPPOR, one can see that:
CT,J =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
∏
ℓ∈[s]
Cbℓ (i, xℓ, yℓ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Where i is the size of the reports associated with the first user, i.e.
∣∣J∣∣, xℓ is the number of ones in
the ℓth position of all the reports in TJ , yℓ is the number of ones in the ℓth position of all the reports
in TJ∁ and bℓ is the value of the underlying Bloom filter at position ℓ. This means that we can
calculate the trackability of report sets by considering only their relevant i, x and y. Therefore in
order to find a tight untrackable bound, we only need to find the values of i, x and y that maximize
trackability. An immediate result of this is that the maximum trackability bound, γk is:
γk = max
i∈[k]
max
v,v′∈[i]
w,w′∈[k−i]
∣∣∣lnC0 (i, v, w)s−hC1 (i, v′, w′)s−h∣∣∣
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This can be easily computed by a simple program.
In the original paper introducing RAPPOR [14], in Section 5 - “Experiments and Evaluation”,
the mechanism was deployed on Chrome users to collect Windows process names. The parameters
used were s = 128, h = 2, f = 0.5, p = 0.5 and q = 0.75. We calculated the tight trackability
bound for RAPPOR with those parameters. Figure 3 shows us the tight untrackable parameter
for up to 15 reports. After as few as 6 reports, RAPPOR is already no better than 50-untrackable,
which should be considered high. At 15 reports, the optimal untrackable parameter is almost 300.
To conclude, RAPPOR behaves poorly in the framework of worst case untrackable parameter.
Figure 3: Trackability of RAPPOR for given number of reports
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E.3 Estimated Median and 90th Percentile Of RAPPOR Figure
Figure 4: Growth of the estimated median and 90th percentile of the trackability random variable
of RAPPOR as a function of the number of reports
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E.4 Details of the Estimation of the Trackability Random Variable
We show how to evaluate the median of the trackability random variable (the 50th percentile) and
the 90th percentile of it. We used a 95% confidence interval for the results we present in Figure 4.
Let τ be the random variable described above. This is the random variable whose percentiles
we are interested in finding. We generated the vectors ~T and ~T ′ according to their respective
distributions. We calculate the value τ from ~T and ~T ′ and use τ as the sample taken at each
iteration. For convenience, we mark νi as the i
th smallest sample. We generated 10000 such
samples, i.e. values of τ , and picked ν5000, which is the median, namely the 50
th percentile. For the
median’s upper bound of the confidence interval, we picked the sample ν5100. This sample has the
property that 51% of all samples are smaller then it. Similarly, for the lower bound, we chose ν4900
for which 49% of all samples are smaller. These bounds match a 95% confidence interval for the
median’s estimation. We also picked ν9000, which is the 90
th percentile. For the 90th percentile’s
upper bound of the confidence interval, we picked the sample ν9060. This sample has the property
that 90.6% of all samples are smaller then it. Similarly, for the lower bound, we chose ν8940 for
which 89.4% of all samples are smaller. These bounds match a 95% confidence interval for the 90th
percentile’s estimation.
Our selection of the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals is based on the fact
that the probability that the qth percentile is between the ℓth smallest sample and the vth smallest
sample out of n samples is at least:
B
(
v − 1, n, q
100
)
−B
(
ℓ− 1, n, q
100
)
(E.1)
Where B (k, n, p) is the probability of having at most k 1’s out of n bits drawn from Ber (p), i.e. the
cumulative density function of the Binomial distribution. This can be seen in section 5.2.1 of the
book ”Statistical Intervals: a guide for Practitioners and Researchers”, by Luis A. Escobar, Gerald
J. Hahn and William Q. Meeker [17]. To see the logic behind this calculation, first notice that:
1. For the real qth percentile to be at most at the vth position in the sorted samples, less than
v of the samples need to be smaller.
2. For the qth percentile to be at most at the ℓth position in the sorted samples, less than ℓ of
the samples need to be smaller.
3. Each sample is smaller than the qth percentile with probability q100 .
This means that the probability of the first happening is B
(
v − 1, n, q100
)
and the probability of the
second happening is B
(
ℓ− 1, n, q100
)
. In total, the probability that the qth percentile is between the
ℓth smallest sample and the vth smallest sample is exactly the subtraction of the second probability,
B
(
ℓ− 1, n, q100
)
, from the first B
(
v − 1, n, q100
)
, resulting in Equation (E.1).
For n = 10000, plugging in q = 50, ℓ = 4900, v = 5100 gives the confidence level:
Pr [B (5099, 10000, 0.5)]− Pr [B (4899, 10000, 0.5)] = 0.95449433663
≥ 0.95
37
Therefore, with probability at least 0.95, the median is between the 4900th smallest sample and the
5100th smallest sample. Plugging in q = 90, ℓ = 8940, v = 9060 gives the confidence level:
Pr [B (9059, 10000, 0.9)]− Pr [B (8939, 10000, 0.9)] = 0.9545103468
≥ 0.95
Therefore, with probability at least 0.95, the 90th percentile is between the 9060th smallest sample
and the 8940th smallest sample.
Algorithm 1 is a pseudo code of the calculations we have performed to generate the results in
Figure 4.
Algorithm 1: Estimation of the median and the 90th percentile of RAPPOR’s trackability
for k reports
Input: RAPPOR parameters s ∈ N+, h ∈ [s] and f, p, q ∈ [0, 1]
Result: Trackability random variable estimated median, V50, and 90 percentile, V90 and
their respective 95% upper confidence bound, HighConf50 and HighConf90 and
their repsective lower confidence bound, LowConf50, LowConf90
1 NSAMPS ← 10000 // Number of samples
2 Samples← []
3 for m := 1 to NSAMPS do
4 MaxSamples← 0
5 for i := 1 to ⌊k2⌋ do
6 Choose random value u ∈ U
7 Generate reports T1 by executing G
R
i (u)
8 b Generate reports T2 by executing G
R
k−i (u)
9 T ← T1 ∪ T2
10 J ← [i]
11 MaxSamples← max {MaxSamples, CT,J}
12 end
13 SamplesOneUser← []
14 for i := 1 to ⌊k2⌋ do
15 Choose random value u ∈ U
16 Generate report T by executing GRk (u)
17 J ← [i]
18 MaxSamples← max {MaxSamples, CT,J}
19 end
20 Append MaxSample to Samples
21 end
22 Sort Samples
23 V50 ← Samples[0.5 ·NSAMPS]
24 LowConf50 ← Samples[0.49 ·NSAMPS]
25 HighConf50 ← Samples[0.51 ·NSAMPS]
26 V90 ← Samples[0.9 ·NSAMPS]
27 LowConf90 ← Samples[0.894 ·NSAMPS]
28 HighConf90 ← Samples[0.906 ·NSAMPS]
38
F Privacy, Accuracy and Trackability of The Bitwise Mechanism
F.1 Privacy
Calculating the privacy of this mechanism is straightforward. Theorem 4.3 tells us that a single
report is ln e
ε1+ε2+1
eε1+eε2 -DP. The best an adversary can do from a set of reports that originated from
one user is to identify that user’s state. The Construct User’s Permanent State stage assures us
that the state is ε1-DP in the input, resulting in the mechanism being ε1-EDP.
F.2 Accuracy
Let the group of all users who have value 0 be I0. A report r generated by user i ∈ I0 is drawn
from a Bernoulli distribution: r ∼ Ber
(
eε1 + eε2
(eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
)
. A report r generated by user i /∈ I0
is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution as: r ∼ Ber
(
eε1+ε2 + 1
(eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
)
. Let p0 and p1 be the
fraction of the users who have value 0 and 1 respectively.
Theorem F.1. Let β ∈ [0, 1]. With probability 1 − β over the randomness of all users, Bitwise
Everlasting Privacy outputs p˜0 such that,
∣∣p˜0 − p0∣∣ ≤ (eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
(eε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
√
2 ln (2/β)
n
If we define p as the vector whose coordinates are p0 and p1, and similarly p˜, then Theorem F.1
tells us that
∥∥p˜ − p∥∥∞ ≤ (eε1+1)(eε2+1)(eε1−1)(eε2−1)√2 ln(2/β)n . The proof follows a “standard” Chernoff bound
structure. It reduces the question of accuracy to the setting in Theorem A.1.
Proof. Notice that |I0| = p0n. Let Xi be the reports generated by users in I0 and Yi the reports
generated by other users. We examine S =
∑
i∈[n] ri, which is more suitable to bound:
S =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
ri
=
1
n
∑
i∈I0
Xi +
∑
i∈[n]\I0
Yi

Where, as we mentioned before, Xi ∼ Ber
(
eε1+eε2
(eε1+1)(eε2+1)
)
and Yi ∼ Ber
(
eε1+ε2+1
(eε1+1)(eε2+1)
)
. Therefore
S is the average of n random variables that are all drawn independently from Bernoulli distributions.
Applying Theorem A.1 we have that:
Pr
[∣∣S − E [S]∣∣ >√ ln (2/β)
2n
]
≤ 2e−2n
(√
ln(2/β)
2n
)2
= β
Notice that p˜0 =
eε1+ε2+1−S
(eε1−1)(eε2−1) .
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The expectation of p˜u is:
E [p˜0] = E
[
eε1+ε2 + 1− S
(eε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
]
=
eε1+ε2 + 1− E [S]
(eε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
And the expectation of S is:
E [S] = E
 1
n
∑
i∈I0
Xi +
∑
i∈[n]\I0
Yi

=
eε1 + eε2
(eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
p0 +
eε1+ε2 + 1
(eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
(1− p0)
=
eε1+ε2 + 1
(eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
− (e
ε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
(eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
p0
Plugging this back in E [p˜0] we have that:
E [p˜0] = p0
Which means that:
Pr
[∣∣S − E [S]∣∣ >√ ln (2/β)
2n
]
= Pr
[∣∣(eε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
(eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
(p˜0 − p0)
∣∣ >√ ln (2/β)
2n
]
= β
and we get the required bound:
Pr
[∣∣p˜0 − p0∣∣ > (eε1 + 1) (eε2 + 1)
(eε1 − 1) (eε2 − 1)
√
2 ln (2/β)
n
]
≤ β.
We can give a slightly more intuitive upper bound on the error:
Corollary F.2. For any β > 0 with probability 1 − β the maximal difference between p and p˜ is
bounded by: ∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ (ε1 + 2) (ε2 + 2)ε1 · ε2
√
32 ln (2/β)
n
F.3 Trackability
Theorem 3.9 gives us an upper bound on the untrackable parameter of the mechanism, namely that
the mechanism is
⌊
k
2
⌋
ε2-untrackable.
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We show a lower bound for the untrackable parameter of the mechanism: for k reports the
mechanism is at least γ⋆k-untrackable for γ
⋆
k =
k
2ε2− ε1− ln 2. Let px,y be the probability of having
a stream of y reports x of which are 1’s. We have that:
px,y =
eε1
1 + eε1
·
(
eε2
1 + eε2
)x( 1
1 + eε2
)y−x
+
1
1 + eε1
·
(
1
1 + eε2
)x( eε2
1 + eε2
)y−x
=
eε1+xε2 + e(y−x)ε2
(1 + eε1) (1 + eε2)y
Now examine the set of k reports where one half of them is all 1 bits and the other half is all 0
bits. This means that in this case the untrackable parameter is at least:(
eε1 + e
k
2
ε2
)(
eε1+
k
2
ε2 + 1
)
(eε1)
(
e
k
2
ε2 + eε1+
k
2
ε2
) ≥
(
1 + e
k
2
ε2
)(
eε1 + eε1+
k
2
ε2
)
(1 + eε1)
(
e
k
2
ε2 + eε1+
k
2
ε2
)
=
eε1
(
e
k
2
ε2 + 1
)2
(eε1 + 1)2 e
k
2
ε2
≥ 1
4
e
k
2
ε2−ε1
which gives us the lower bound of k2ε2 − ε1 − ln 2 to the mechanism’s untrackable parameter.
G Privacy, Accuracy and Trackability of RNIP
G.1 Privacy
The set of all vectors and the results of the inner products is essentially a composition of differential
private mechanisms, where each mechanism is the noisy inner product with a single vector. Our
privacy analysis is for approximate differential privacy. A pure differential privacy guarantee can
also be calculated. However, in this case there is much to be gained from the fact that, under
approximate differential privacy, the guarantees deteriorate only as a square root of the number of
mechanisms composed. Assume we want approximate everlasting privacy (ε, δ) (for ε < 1), if we
define:
ε′ :=
ε
2
√
2L ln
(
1
δ
)
We choose ε′ as the differential privacy guarantee of each noisy inner product. We can use Advanced
Composition [12] to show that the state, consisting of the L vectors and the corresponding inner
products, is (ε, δ)-Differentially Private in the user’s data. Consider an adversary who is only given
access to the reports of users. The best this adversary can do is to restore the entire state of the
user, resulting in the mechanism being (ε, δ)-Differentially Private.
G.2 Accuracy
For the accuracy analysis, we first present an accurate bound that is less intuitive. This analysis is
similar to the one done in the “Practical Locally Private Heavy Hitters” paper [2] discussed in 2.2.
41
It is also very similar to the one done in the “How to (not) share a password: Privacy preserving
protocols for finding heavy hitters with adversarial behavior” paper [18], described as well in 2.2,
which uses a similar mechanism, only with a single vector per user. The proof uses Theorem A.1
to bound the probability that a single frequency is estimated poorly, and by using union bound,
we bound the probability that any frequency are estimated poorly. After we prove this, we present
a more intuitive, easier to work with bound.
Theorem G.1. Let β ∈ [0, 1]. With probability 1 − β over the randomness of all users, Report
noisy inner product outputs p˜ such that,
∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ 2d − 12d−1 eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1
√
2 ln 2
d+1
β
n
The proof follows a standard Chernoff bound structure. It begins by bounding the error of the
estimate of every possible user data u using the additive Chernoff bound, and with union bound,
shows that the bound holds for all possible user data with probability 1− β.
Proof. We begin with a lemma that bounds the probability of having a big error on the estimation
of the frequency of a single private value.
Lemma G.2. Let β ∈ [0, 1]. For all values u ∈ {0, 1}d\{0} we have that,
Pr
|p˜u − pu| > 2d − 1
2d−1
eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1
√
2 ln 2
d+1
β
n
 ≤ β
2d
where the probability is taken over the randomness of all the users.
Proof. Let I be the set of all users who have value u. Notice that |I| = pun. To fit the setting of
Theorem A.1, we examine gu, the fraction of reports that agree with u. In the following sum every
element will be in F2. We will abuse notation and denote the sum of them as the summation of
these elements over the Reals, i.e. as if every one of them was either 0 or 1.
gu :=
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(1⊕ 〈Vi, u〉 ⊕Bi)
=
1
n
∑
i∈I
(1⊕ 〈Vi, u〉 ⊕ 〈Vi, u〉 ⊕Xi) +
∑
i∈[n]\I
(
1⊕ 〈Vi, u〉 ⊕
〈
Vi, u
′〉⊕Xi)

=
1
n
∑
i∈I
(1⊕Xi) +
∑
i∈[n]\I
Yi

Where u′ is any value that is not u and Yi is the XOR of Xi and 〈Vi, u⊕ u′〉. By definition,
Xi ∼ Ber
(
1
1+eε1
)
. It is easy to see that 〈Vi, u⊕ u′〉 ∼ Ber
(
2d−1
2d−1
)
. Since Yi is the XOR of two
Bernoulli random variables, we can use the following simple fact to calculate its distribution:
Fact G.3. Let 0 ≤ q1, q2 ≤ 1. The XOR of two random variables s ∼ Ber (q1) and t ∼ Ber (q2) is
s⊕ t ∼ Ber (2q1q2 − q1 − q2 + 1) .
42
Applying this Fact to Yi we can see that its probability distribution is
Yi ∼ Ber
2d−1
(
eε
′
+ 1
)
− eε′
(2d − 1) (eε′ + 1)

Therefore, gu is the average of n random variables that are all drawn independently from Bernoulli
distributions. Applying Theorem A.1 we have that:
Pr
∣∣gu − E [gu] ∣∣ >
√
ln 2
d+1
β
2n
 ≤ β
2d
(G.1)
Notice that:
gu =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(1⊕ 〈Vi, u〉 ⊕Bi)
=
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(−1)〈Vi, u〉⊕Bi + 1
2
Which means that p˜u =
2d−1
2d
eε
′
+1
eε′−1 (2gu − 1) +
1
2d
.
The expectation of p˜u is:
E [p˜u] =
2d − 1
2d
eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1 (2E [gu]− 1) +
1
2d
And the expectation of gu is:
E [gu] = E
 1
n
∑
i∈I
1⊕Xi +
∑
i∈[n]\I
Yi

=
 2d−1
(
eε
′ − 1
)
(2d − 1) (eε′ + 1)
 pu + 2d−1
(
eε
′
+ 1
)
− eε′
(2d − 1) (eε′ + 1)
Plugging this back in E [p˜u] we have that E [p˜u] = pu. This allows us to take Inequality (G.1) and
transform it to get the bound required:
Pr
∣∣p˜u − pu∣∣ > 2d − 1
2d−1
eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1
√
2 ln 2
d+1
β
n
 ≤ β
2d
Now using Lemma G.2 and union bound on all possible user values u we have that:
Pr
∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ 2d − 12d−1 eε
′
+ 1
eε
′ − 1
√
2 ln 2
d+1
β
n
 ≥ 1− β
as required.
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One can upper bound this error with a slightly more intuitive bound
Corollary G.4. Let β ∈ [0, 1]. With probability 1 − β the maximal difference between p˜ and p is
bounded by: ∥∥p˜− p∥∥∞ ≤ ε′ + 2ε′
√
8 ln 2
d+1
β
n
Notice that the sum of the coordinates of p˜ is 1:
Lemma G.5. The sum of all estimated frequencies sums up to one, i.e.
∑
u
p˜u = 1
Proof. By the definition of p˜u we have that:
∑
u
p˜u =
∑
u
2d − 1
2dn
eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1
∑
i∈[n]
(−1)〈Vi, u〉⊕Bi + 1
2d

=
2d − 1
2dn
eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1
∑
i∈[n]
∑
u
(−1)〈Vi, u〉 + 1
=
2d − 1
2dn
eε
′
+ 1
eε′ − 1
∑
i∈[n]
0 + 1
= 1
where the second equality is due to the fact that since Vi 6= ~0 there exists a vector u′ such that
〈Vi, u′〉 = Bi, and third equality is due to the fact that since Vi 6= ~0 there exists a vector u⋆ such
that for all u, 〈Vi, u〉 = 1⊕ 〈Vi, u⊕ u⋆〉, meaning (−1)〈Vi, u〉 + (−1)〈Vi, u⊕u
⋆〉 = 0.
G.3 Trackability
Our scheme is untrackable for “not so large” number of reports. We prove that, when k ≪ √L
(and L≪ 2d2 ) then Report Noisy Inner Product has fair chance of remaining perfectly untrackable
(but this probability is not negligible):
Theorem G.6. Let k, L, d be positive integers. Report Noisy Inner Product, with state size L for
a domain of size 2d, is
(
0, k
2
L +
L2
2d
)
-untrackable for k reports.
Proof. The strategy of proving this theorem is:
1. Define an event B so that conditioned on it not occurring, both the single user case and the
two users case are identically distributed.
2. B has a probability of at most k
2
2L +
L2
2d
of occurring both in the single user case and the two
users case.
The event B occurs when any two vectors used for two of the k reports are identical. To see
this, first consider the stateless version of the Report Noisy Inner Product. At each report, this
mechanism chooses a random vector and reports the vector and the noisy inner product of that
vector with the private value. Conditioned on B not happening, the Report Noisy Inner Product
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is equivalent to its stateless version. Since for the stateless mechanism each report is completely
independent it does not matter if the reports were generated by a single user or two. This means
that, conditioned on B not happening, both cases are identically distributed.
For the single user case, event B happens with probability at most
(
k
2
)
/L ≤ k22L+ L
2
2d
. For the two
user set, let k1 and k2 be the number of reports attributed to the first and second user respectively
(so that k1 + k2 = k). The probability of having two identical reports in the first user’s reports is(k1
2
)
/L, and similarly
(k2
2
)
/L for the second user’s reports. The probability of a first user’s report
being equal to a second user’s report is upper bounded by the probability that both users choose
an identical vector for one of their stored reports. This probability is upper bounded by L
2
2d
. This
results in the probability of having two identical reports if the reports originated from two distinct
users being at most 1L ·
(k1
2
)
+ 1L ·
(k2
2
)
+ L
2
2d
≤ k22L + L
2
2d
.
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